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How does the coronavirus impact global security and defence? This essay asks what the short, medium and long-term implications of the virus are. Since uncertainty pervades 
the political and geopolitical dimensions of the coronavirus crisis, 
I will consider its many and conflicting eventualities. Some security 
implications may be negative, while others more positive.
The first question should be if we are at war. Despite the frequent 
use of the term “war” by the French President Emmanuel Macron 
and others, this is misleading terminology. The coronavirus is not a 
human being, it does not have political intentions, it does not make 
counter-moves.1 Societies may mobilize in similar ways to a “war-
like” situation, but there is no need for secrecy and closed war-room 
strategies. The challenges facing global societies can therefore be 
discussed openly without the risk of exposing plans and strategies 
to the adversary. Nonetheless, the high level of uncertainty combined 
with need for rapid decision making have similarities to Clausewitz’ 
concept of the “fog of war”.2 Another similarity to warfare is the 
balance between experts (generals or health authorities) and 
politicians. In a crisis the former may want to take stronger measures 
to achieve their sector-specific objectives—while politicians may 
need to take a broader perspective and balance measures with e.g. 
economic impact. However, it could also be the opposite: because 
of public stress and fear, politicians may want to be on the safer side 
than experts advise and introduce stronger measures at an earlier 
stage than advised by the experts. There are indications that this 
has been the case in some countries during the coronavirus crisis. 
“Better safe than sorry” has probably been a guiding principle for 
many politicians when making decisions with so many unknowns. 
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The term “securitization” was famously coined 
in academic terms in the 1990s by professor Ole 
Wæver and his associates.3 It describes a process 
when an issue becomes so “hot” that it is lifted out 
of regular political decision making and made into 
an existential question. As a result, extraordinary 
counter-measures are warranted in the name of 
security. Such processes require both securitizing 
actors who push the agenda and an audience that 
accepts the securitization. The point is that it is not 
objectively given what can be regarded as a threat 
and how states respond to them. The same risk or 
danger may be interpreted differently in different 
places, leading to different policies in response. 
The various political responses to the coronavirus 
certainly bear the trademarks of “securitization”. 
The strategies chosen by countries have been 
dissimilar. Some have introduced curfews while 
others have kept society more or less open. Many 
societal factors have played into the choice of 
strategy, even if the virus is the same. Much of this 
is due to better knowledge, medicine and effective 
counter-measures. Nonetheless, debates about the 
level of response, the kind of measures chosen, at 
what time, and to what end, are bound to emerge 
when the situation normalises. Decisions were 
made under sub-optimal conditions: in the “fog 
of war”, under stress, with limited knowledge, and 
under severe uncertainty. Still, “securitization” and 
“better safe than sorry”-approaches may also have 
contributed to decisions that had huge negative 
side-effects on the economy, on social welfare, 
health and on global security. 
The challenges in the wake of the virus—and our 
response to it—are many. Some of these challenges 
are short-term, some are more long-term, some 
related to the virus, other to the economy. In the 
following I will try to sketch how they relate to 
global security and defence.
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For the armed forces, the most visible and 
immediate short-term effect of the virus was 
that troops were incapacitated. The first and 
most dramatic example was when Capt. 
(N) Brett Crozier, commander of the aircraft 
carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt, reported 
that over 100 sailors had contracted the 
coronavirus.4 Because of the physical 
limitations on board the ship, social 
distancing was impossible and Crozier 
wrote that “the spread of the disease is on-
going and accelerating” among the 4000 
crew on board. Later on, it was reported that 
840 crew members had been infected.5 A 
few weeks later the French aircraft carrier 
Charles de Gaulle, suffered a similar fate 
when about 60% of the crew were infected.6 
The subsequent political fall-outs aside, 
the cases illustrate how epidemic diseases 
also make modern war-fighting platforms 
vulnerable. This, of course, is nothing new. 
Disease has always been a major challenge 
on battlefields due to the harsh conditions 
in war. It is, however, less common in 
peacetime. Nevertheless, the confined space 
on ships and in barracks make sailors and 
soldiers vulnerable in different ways than 
the rest of the society. The coronavirus has 
been a reminder that this remains the case, 
and that this is yet another element of “fog 
of war” that military planners cannot predict. 
The good news, if that is the correct term, 
is that it is equally risky for both sides in 
a conflict. The virus does not distinguish 
between friend and foe. This fact is perhaps 
one of the reasons why biological and 
chemical weapons have not been used very 
much since World War I: you cannot control 
the path of the virus, and it can easily backfire 
and knock out entire units once unleashed. 
In the short term, armed forces across the 
globe have had to cancel exercises and 
other planned activity due to the pandemic.7 
They are also taking new measures to 
be better prepared and to remain agile, 
an effort which has involved everything 
from acquiring facemasks to devising new 
routines at bases.8 
The medium term challenges to security and 
defence are nonetheless numerous. The first 
is that there is a risk that defence budgets 
will be reduced, or at least not increased, 
given the economic meltdown.9 As most 
Western governments borrow money to 
make it through the crisis, tough choices 
will have to be made. Politicians are likely to 
prioritize measures to restore the economy, 
secure social welfare, strengthen health care 
etc. In other words, it is possible that welfare 
will be prioritized over warfare even after 
the pandemic is over. One would hope that 
politicians have learnt that a crisis of any 
shape and form may occur unexpectedly, and 
that general societal and state preparedness 
is required to deal with it. Though our current 
crisis does not involve our armed forces (at 
least not in their traditional function), it has 
reminded us of the enduring possibility of 
worst-case-scenario crises, and indeed the 
need to remain ready to deal with them.10
Unfortunately, however, there is a well-known 
tendency among politicians (and generals) 
to prepare for the previous war instead of 
the next. Hence, national (and international) 
measures to enhance crisis preparedness 
post-coronavirus are likely to focus primarily on 
the health and economic sectors. Investment in 
conventional security and defence systems—
such as fighter jets, ships and missiles—may 
not be prioritized.11 It is the kind of insurance 
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usually associated with “low probability/
high impact”- in other words, risks where the 
potential consequences are severe, but the 
likelihood of such risks materialising is low. 
In tough economic times, the low likelihood 
is emphasized—with a “fingers crossed” 
attitude to low probability risks. Since the 
virus has hit the entire globe, one could hope 
that potential adversaries for Western states 
face similar budgetary constraints and may 
choose to slash their military budgets. 
Unfortunately, in contrast to democracies, 
authoritarian regimes have historically often 
prioritized warfare over welfare for their 
citizens. A global détente is therefore an 
unlikely outcome of the coronavirus crisis.
A strategy for military organizations to 
counter budget-cuts is to try to make 
themselves relevant in crises other than war, 
which we have seen with militaries erecting 
field hospitals and NATO allies using military 
cargo planes to bring supplies to each 
other.12 However, it remains a challenge 
that the military organizations are designed 
primarily for high-end warfare. They struggle 
with other forms of crisis management, 
whether it is migration, pandemics or even 
terrorism. Police, customs and other actors 
are usually better designed for dealing with 
these crises, and the military often becomes 
an over-sized add-on. Making the armed 
forces more relevant for low-end crises is a 
necessity—not only to keep defence budgets 
reasonably high but also to safeguard 
national welfare and security.13 Nevertheless, 
chances are slim that ministries of defence 
will be budgetary winners in NATO countries 
in the coming years. Despite all the words 
of “strategic autonomy” and a “European 
pillar in NATO”, the coronavirus crisis is 
likely to leave European defence shattered, 
splintered and weak. Planned EU defence 
projects, such as the flagship military 
mobility project, was proposed to be cut 
entirely—to 0 Euros—by the EU Commission, 
even before the coronavirus outbreak.14 The 
prospect of any major defence investments 
in the Europe is therefore bleak.
One could hope that this situation would 
make states, in the long-term, more willing to 
engage in joint projects, as recently argued by 
Wolfgang Ischinger and others.15 However, 
the experience over the last decade or so 
is not too positive. Neither the EU’s “pooling 
and sharing” initiative nor NATO’s “smart 
defence” initiative, both launched almost 
a decade ago, has gained much traction.16 
European states appear to be reluctant to 
build joint military units, structures and 
organizations, or to share equipment. The 
use of force remains a national competence 
in the EU and beyond. As a result, armies 
are predominantly national, with only 
limited ability to plug into larger formations 
if needed. There is no indication that the 
coronavirus crisis will change this pattern, 
unfortunately. 
Although it faces its fair share of challenges 
too, a less ambitions objective would be to 
purchase similar equipment and organize 
joint maintenance—while keeping them 
under national control. The plurality of types 
of fighter jets, navy vessels and battle tanks 
in Europe is a serious obstacle to joint and 
multi-national operations. Hence, the very 
rationale of the recent EU projects in the 
European Defence Fund was to counter this 
trend. But this will take years and decades 
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to materialize. Furthermore, recent experience in 
common procurement is not very positive: The 
NH-90 helicopter for instance, became delayed 
and expensive partly because every customer 
(states and branches) had their own operational 
requirements and specification demands.17 Defence 
industries remains (semi-)national and protected in 
most European countries, and defence procurement 
remains a national prerogative. The coronavirus 
crisis is probably not inducing states to make 
their defence industries more open for external 
competition or to buy less defence materiel from 
domestic producers. European defence integration 
and cooperation are therefore unlikely to be a long-
term outcome of the crisis. 
It has been argued that the European Union has 
failed during the crisis.18 Many people, particularly 
in Italy and Spain, have expressed dissatisfaction 
with the EU.19 The fact that both security and 
health remain national competencies and therefore 
strictly speaking not EU responsibilities, is almost 
irrelevant when crisis erupts. The EU as a political 
project has become too big and ambitious to be 
able to turn a blind eye on the crisis. People expect 
an EU response or at least coordination irrespective 
of formal competencies. What is at stake is the 
political solidarity that the Euro, the Lisbon Treaty 
and the Common Market rests upon. A failure to 
deliver and come out of the crisis united will have 
long-term negative effects for the EU. Furthermore, 
the EU as an international player will suffer because 
external potency stems from internal strength. If 
the EU cannot keep order in its own house, how 
can it be expected to play a role internationally 
and globally? Strategic documents and visions are 
worthless if they are not based upon a coherent 
internal political base. The current political 
fragmentations, exacerbated by the coronavirus, do 
not contribute to this end.
Investment in 
conventional 
security and 
defence 
systems—such as 
fighter jets, ships 
and missiles—may 
not be prioritized.
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However, if nothing else, intra-European pandemic 
preparedness and crisis response mechanisms are 
likely to be better organized and coordinated in the 
future. As the EU has increased its engagement in the 
crisis since April, it is also likely that there is still time 
for the EU to play an important role and remind Europe 
of the organization’s importance. What’s more, research 
shows that the EU historically has been surprisingly 
resilient in face of crises.20 Even still, there is a sticky, 
perhaps intractable disagreement that will hold 
progress back: financial assistance packages and the 
mutualisation of European debt. If the cleavages that 
emerged after the financial crisis between the north and 
south are deepened, the prospects of the future of the 
European political project is grim. If, on the other hand, 
the economic recovery is quicker and less socially 
destructive than a decade ago, the prospects for a 
united and thus stable and secure Europe is higher. 
A stronger Europe will be needed in the geopolitical 
global order that is now emerging. The most important 
global trend that has been exacerbated by the crisis is the 
rising tension between the US and China, combined with 
the withdrawal of the US as a defender of international 
liberal order. President Donald Trump’s attack on the 
World Health Organization is a good illustration. The 
dissemination of conspiracy theories by the Chinese 
government regarding the origin of the virus is another. 
The result of accusations, propaganda, supply chain 
restrictions, and other measures seems to be a more 
insecure world—a world with rising tensions and more 
dominated by the major powers. The tensions between 
the US and China will have global implications, and 
European states will feel the consequences. The debates 
over the 5G telecom network are an early indicator 
of this dynamic. European states are experiencing a 
more vocal and engaged Chinese diplomacy that is not 
shying away from criticizing those challenging Chinese 
positions and practices. In some of these conflicts, the 
US and Europe are likely to stand united—but not in all. 
The most important 
global trend 
that has been 
exacerbated by the 
crisis is the rising 
tension between 
the US and China
‘‘
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In such a situation, a fragmented Europe 
is easily swayed by big power pressure. 
Chinese coronavirus-aid can surely be seen 
in such a light where gifts and assistance 
are also influence campaigns, aiming at 
painting a positive picture of China. While 
such a modus operandi is by no means 
uniquely Chinese, it is a novel experience 
and a pressure that European states must 
deal with. The situation not only creates 
a public relations victory for China in the 
present, it may also lead China to expect 
favours in return in the future. 
Increased US focus on China may have 
negative implications for European security 
as well. Ever since President Obama 
launched the “pivot to Asia”, Europeans 
have feared they could end up as losers in 
a military zero-sum game between Europe 
and the Asia-Pacific. As the US is assessed 
to only have the political and military 
capacity to engage in one major theatre at a 
time, Europe may not be granted the security 
guarantees it traditionally has enjoyed.21 The 
Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014 made 
the US both remain in and strengthen its 
presence in Europe. This, however, may be 
changing.  The US Marine Corps’ new “Vison 
and Strategy 2025” is almost solely focused 
on China, making its future role in Europe 
somewhat more uncertain.22 Furthermore, 
given potential budgetary constraints in the 
US post-coronavirus, the US presence in 
Europe may again be reduced.23 
For Europe the neighbouring environment 
may also be tougher to handle. Measures 
to reduce the spread of the virus, such as 
social distancing and economic shutdowns, 
have much more immediate implications in 
poor countries than in richer ones. Without 
any social welfare benefits available, 
hunger and desperation are much more 
likely implications of the crisis than in 
most European states. Furthermore, even 
when these measures are lifted, the global 
economic recession or slowdown is likely 
to hit the poorest countries the hardest. 
The potential for social unrest is therefore 
likely to be pretty high in many countries 
surrounding Europe. Countries in the Middle 
East and North Africa, but also further away, 
such as central Asia or Western Africa, 
may face new instability in the wake of 
the coronavirus crisis. In the worst-case 
scenarios, this could again cause unrest 
and violence, as well as worsening the on-
going migration crisis on Europe’s borders.
Despite all this, there is a saying that one 
should “never waste a good crisis”. Crises 
are also opportunities. Changes can be 
made that under normal circumstances are 
hard to accomplish. It is an opportunity to 
build the foundations for new initiatives. 
Many have already pointed to the need 
and opportunity to turn green and address 
climate change in a much more substantial 
way. For security and defence there are 
also opportunities. An obvious example 
is the utility of new security technology. 
Debates about various digital applications 
for tracking of people are already emerging, 
as authorities in many countries seek ways 
to prevent massive outbreak of the virus.24 
More conventional security and defence 
systems may now also accelerate towards a 
less human-dependent future. Perhaps new 
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robotics and other digital and autonomous systems can help an aircraft carrier 
remain operational even if half the crew is knocked out by a virus. The digital 
revolution was on its way before the coronavirus, but new knowledge about 
societal weaknesses in health and civil preparedness may trigger new ideas, 
solutions and technologies that are more resilient (or less fragile) than existing 
solutions and organizations. Before this can materialize, however, the world 
will need to navigate through the dire straits of both short- and medium-term 
challenges. If states, international organizations and enterprises fail in resolving 
these peacefully, insecurity and instability may characterize international 
relations in the years to come. 
In such a scenario, the coronavirus may even be the foundation for new 
weapons. As Walter Russel Mead has put it, “the virus has provided the world 
with an extraordinary demonstration of the power of weaponized biology”.25 
The 20th century, he argues, was the Age of Physics, with the nuclear bomb as 
the primary weapon. The 21st century, he continues, “looks now to be an Age 
of Biology, when the capacity to unleash gene-engineered plagues on one’s 
opponents—or their crops—can provide countries with strategic advantage”. 
However, as mentioned above, viruses cannot be controlled once unleashed. This 
applies to both biological and digital viruses. As a result, their military utility is 
debatable and Mead’s predictions may therefore be exaggerated. Even still, the 
merger of biology and digital technology is coming. The fusion of the digital and 
autonomous with bio, nano and chemical substrates is at the forefront of on-
going research, including in the military sector.26 This is the arms-race of the 21st 
century. What that will bring is unknown—but in the worst case it could dwarf the 
coronavirus crisis.  
A longer version of this text was originally written for the project  
“The World After: Reflections and Perspectives on a Post-pandemic  
World”, to be published by the New Strategy Centre, Bucharest, Romania.
BIOWAR NEXT? SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CORONAVIRUS  |  Karsten Friis 11
1 Henrik Breitenbauch, “How Military Strategy Can Aid the Response to COVID-19”, 
World Politics Review, 27 April 2020, https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/
articles/28714/how-military-strategy-can-aid-the-response-to-covid-19
2 Ibid.
3 Barry Buzan, Jaap de Wilde, and Ole Wæver. Security: A New 
Framework for Analysis. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998.
4 Exclusive: Captain of aircraft carrier with growing coronavirus outbreak pleads for 
help from Navy”, San Francisco Chronicle, 31 March 2020, https://www.sfchronicle.
com/bayarea/article/Exclusive-Captain-of-aircraft-carrier-with-15167883.php
5 840 sailors on USS Theodore Roosevelt test positive for COVID-19, Navy says”, 
USA Today, 27 April 2020, https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/us/840-sailors-on-
uss-theodore-roosevelt-test-positive-for-covid-19-navy-says/ar-BB138DKP
6 “Coronavirus: 668 infected on French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle”, BBC 
News, 16 April 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-52308073
7 See e.g. “British Army’s response to the Coronavirus outbreak”, https://
www.army.mod.uk/news-and-events/covid-19/.
8 “DOD Remains Flexible, Agile in Face of Coronavirus”, Department of Defense, 5 May 2020, 
https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2176456/dod-remains-flexible-agile-
in-face-of-coronavirus/; “Coronavirus Prompts Military Bases to Change Routines”, Wall Street 
Journal, 20 March 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/military-bases-wary-of-shutting-down-
start-to-pull-back-11584709201; “SECDEF issues guidelines for how troops will start wearing 
face coverings in public to prevent COVID-19 spread”, Military Times, 5 April 2020, https://
www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2020/04/05/troops-to-start-wearing-face-
masks-in-public-to-prevent-coronavirus-spread/; “With big spray of disinfectants, Armed Forces 
fight sneaking new enemy”, The Barents Observer, 5 May 2020, https://thebarentsobserver.
com/en/security/2020/05/big-spray-disinfectants-armed-forces-fight-sneaking-new-enemy.
9 Douglas Barric and Nick Childs, “Defence spending and plans: will the pandemic take 
its toll?”, IISS Military Balance Blog, 1 April 2020, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-
balance/2020/04/defence-spending-coronavirus. See also e.g. “COVID-19: Recession will take 
its toll on defence budget”, Financial Express, 16 April 2020, https://www.financialexpress.
com/defence/covid-19-recession-will-take-its-toll-on-defence-budget/1930787/
10 Dick Zandee, Els Duchateau-Polkerman, and Adája Stoetman: Defence & Covid-19: Why 
budget cuts should be off the table, Amsterdam: Clingendael Institute, 2020.
11 Barric and Childs, “Defence spending and plans”.
12 See NATO homepage: https://www.nato.int/
13 Alexey D. Muraviev, “In the war against coronavirus, we need the military to play a much 
bigger role”, The Conversation, 25 March 2020,  https://theconversation.com/in-the-war-
against-coronavirus-we-need-the-military-to-play-a-much-bigger-role-134149; Jonathan 
Marcus,  “Coronavirus: Five things the military can do during pandemic”, BBC News, 21 
March 2020; George Monbiot: “What does ‘national defence’ mean in a pandemic? It’s 
no time to buy fighter jet”, The Guardian, 8 April 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2020/apr/08/national-defence-corona-pandemic-fighter-jets
Endnotes
LSE IDEAS Strategic Update  |  May 202012
14 “Europe’s military mobility: latest casualty of EU budget battle”, EURACTIV, 
25 February 2020, https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/
europes-military-mobility-latest-casualty-of-eu-budget-battle/
15 https://www.newstrategycenter.ro/amb-wolfgang-ischinger-at-nsc-video-conference-the-
challenges-of-the-pandemic-to-the-democratic-world/. See also Claudia Major and Christian 
Mölling, “Saving European Defense From the Coronavirus Pandemic”, Carnegie Europe, 
30 April 2020, https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/81699?fbclid=IwAR2icEa_
GOJze3Zh0kYrqetjiuQ1tD2ddSCFcGTWbi-tTWO8CVKX9uyCqYM 
16 Christian Mölling, Pooling and Sharing in the EU and NATO, SWP Comment 2012/C 18, June 
2012, https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2012C18_mlg.pdf
17 “NH90: Europe’s Medium Helicopter Gets New Order Despite Issues”, 
Defence Industry Daily, 19 February 2020, https://www.defenseindustrydaily.
com/nh90-europes-medium-helicopter-contender-04135/
18 Scott L Greer: “How Did the E.U. Get the Coronavirus So Wrong?”, New York Times, 4 
April 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/06/opinion/europe-coronavirus.html
19 Wolfgang Ischinger and Boris Ruge: “Coronavirus crisis: For Europe, it’s a question of 
survival”, Munich Security Conference Op-Ed, 2 April 2020, https://securityconference.
org/en/news/full/coronavirus-crisis-for-europe-its-a-question-of-survival/
20 Marianne Riddervold, Jarle Trondal, and Akasemi Newsome: Palgrave 
Handbook on EU crisis. London: Palgrave Macmillan, forthcoming 2020.
21 Dakota L. Wood (ed.), 2020 Index of U.S: Military Strength, Washington DC: Heritage 
Foundation. See also “The US may not be able to fight two big wars at once”, Defence 
News, 2 October 2018, https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2018/10/04/
can-the-us-fight-two-big-wars-at-once-new-report-casts-doubts/
22 Available at: https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/
Docs/MCVS2025%2030%20June%5B1%5D.pdf
23 “SECDEF Esper Preparing For Future Defense Spending Cuts”, USNI News, 4 May 2020. 
https://news.usni.org/2020/05/04/secdef-esper-preparing-for-future-defense-spending-cuts
24 “A Scramble for Virus Apps That Do No Harm”, The New York Times, 29 April 2020,  
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/29/business/coronavirus-
cellphone-apps-contact-tracing.html
25 Walter Russel Mead: “Century of Bioweapons”, Wall Street Journal, 27 April 2020, 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-century-of-bioweapons-11588025901.
26 Marty Trevino, “Cyber Physical Systems: The Coming 
Singularity”, Prism, Vol 8 No 3, 2019, pp 3–13.

THE AUTHOR
Dr. Karsten Friis is a Senior Research Fellow and Head of 
the Security and Defence Research Group at the Norwegian 
Institute of International Affairs (NUPI). He holds a PhD from 
the University of Groningen and an MSc from the London 
School of Economics. 
LSE IDEAS Strategic Update  |  May 202014
INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY  
AND DIPLOMACY
EXECUTIVE MASTERS PROGRAMME  
LSE IDEAS, a Centre for the study of international 
affairs, brings together academics and policy-
makers to think strategically about world events. 
This one year EXECUTIVE MASTERS PROGRAMME 
is at the heart of that endeavour. While studying  
in a world-leading university you will be able to  
learn from top LSE academics and senior  
policy practitioners.  
The programme will sharpen your ability 
to challenge conventional thinking, explore 
new techniques for addressing risk 
and threats, and coach you in devising 
effective strategies to address them.  
The course has been especially tailored so  
that you can accelerate your career while  
holding a demanding position in the public  
or private sector. 
 “Right from the first week 
 I was able to apply the lessons   
 I had learnt to our operational  
 and policy work and to coach  
 my teams to look at  
 issues differently.”
 
– Karen Pierce
   British Ambassador 
   to the United Nations
 CONTACT US 
  ideas.strategy@lse.ac.uk 
  +44 (0)20 7955 6526 
  lse.ac.uk/ideas/exec ]
What are the possible short-, medium- and long-
term implications of the coronavirus for global 
security and defence? In this Strategic Update, 
Karsten Friis investigates the pandemic’s potential 
consequences for the world, its armed forces, the 
integration of Europe, US-China relations, as well 
as the concept and practice of ‘war’ more broadly. 
Although much remains uncertain, the disruptions 
which are beginning to emerge demand a reckoning 
with a changed world—and world order. 
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